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At the outset, I want to stress that I am talking
about ‘auditing’, which involves a number of
professional requirements and constraints. As
with the debate about accounting and auditing
in the private sector, particularly during the
last two world financial crises, these disciplines
bear directly on real or perceived gaps in the
expectations of what constitutes an ‘audit’.
Unfortunately, any confusion in this respect
seems to be more exaggerated in the case of
performance, as opposed to financial
statements, audits. For many, the latter is a
‘black hole’ requiring explanation, whereas the
former covers government programmes about
which everyone has a view and, often, a personal
interest. Such interest is frequently reflected in
discussions about ‘who pays’ and ‘who benefits’.
Less self-focussed is the broader question about
the ‘public interest’ which is often quoted but
seldom defined. The Australian National Audit
Office (ANAO, 2008a, p. 3) defines a
performance audit as: ‘an independent,
objective and systematic assessment of public
sector entities’ programs, resources,
information systems, performance measures,
monitoring systems and legal and policy
compliance’.
While I draw largely on the ANAO’s
experience, reference is also made to practices
in other countries, in particular, the UK, USA
and New Zealand. The focus is primarily on
three areas where audit expectation gaps can
occur—the application of professional
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standards, accountability for audit performance
and in the implementation of audit
recommendations. The context is an
environment with over 30 years of experience
with performance auditing and a robust
legislative framework that creates expectations
in the parliament and in the general public
(ANAO, 2011a).
The standards framework
Addressing the probably least interesting, but
highly relevant, aspect of this topic first, I note
that professional standards are integral to the
conduct of audits. While the Auditor-General
Act 1997 requires the Australian Auditor-
General to establish and publicise auditing
standards, in essence they largely reflect the
standards developed by the Australian Auditing
and Assurance Standards Board. In turn, the
latter also reflect the International Auditing
Standards.
The Australian Auditor-General, Ian
McPhee, has said that the issue of the auditing
standard (ASAE 3500) in 2008 ‘was a significant
milestone in the evolution of performance
auditing’ (McPhee, 2010). This in part reflected
the paucity of performance audit standards
and replaced two earlier standards (AUS 806
and AUS 808), which were mainly statements of
principle and intent. The latter can be both a
strength and a weakness. A particular statement
in the standards always struck a chord with me:
‘The work undertaken by the auditor is
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permeated by judgement’. Examples were:
‘deciding the nature, timing and extent of
audit procedures’ and ‘the drawing of
conclusions based on the audit evidence
gathered’. In this respect, I would simply
observe that judgement is contestable but
evidence should, ideally, not be. It should be a
reasonable expectation that there would be
agreement on the ‘facts’. More about that later.
McPhee went on to argue that ASAE 3500
introduced greater discipline to performance
auditing (McPhee, 2010). While such discipline
is important for accountability and confidence
in performance auditing, it also facilitates
understanding of what should be expected of
performance audits.
The standard requires compliance with
the fundamental ethical principles of integrity,
objectivity, professional competence and due
care, confidentiality and professional behaviour
(Auditing and Assurance Standards Board,
2008). These requirements are reinforced by
both the Auditor-General Act 1997 and the
Public Service Act 1999 in Australia. They are
necessary conditions for public confidence in
public sector performance auditing, but do not
guarantee relevance in timing and coverage
nor the audit outcome in terms of quality and
usefulness of recommendations and associated
reporting. Professional standards and legal
requirements are disciplines on the audit
processes but judgements have to be made
about the results being achieved by those
processes. That largely comes down to realistic
and robust performance assessments (and
related measures) and, importantly,
accountability for performance.
Accountability for performance
Openness and transparency are the major
strengths of the audit process, reinforced by
audit independence. Much has been written
about audit independence (for example Barrett,
2010a; ANAO, 2011a) and I do not cover the
extensive debate here. However, it has been
generally agreed that audit legislation has been
a major factor in the provision and maintenance
of audit independence. Reference has been
made to ‘model’ legislation, for example in the
UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand.
Basically, independence was simply indicated
as the auditor-general not being able to be
directed as to what, how or when to audit. In
the context of expectation gaps, it is particularly
important for an auditor-general to be able to
demonstrate accountability for the exercise of
independence as a means of promoting
understanding of, and confidence in, audit
outcomes.
Audit selection and programming
Any audit expectation gap is frequently reflected
in criticisms about the ‘what’ and ‘when’ to
audit decisions. On the one hand, an auditor-
general can be criticised for being too
acquiescent to pressures applied by particular
groups such as the government, the opposition,
the public service, the media, and individual or
collective community organizations.
Disappointment is sometimes expressed about
the ‘opaque’ nature of audit conclusions and
recommendations. This may be due to audit
selection, or the fact that the audit is simply ‘a
good news story’. Surprisingly, an audit that
largely reports good performance is frequently
not regarded with a great deal of interest.
Unfortunately, there is also at least the ‘unstated’
but sometimes ‘implied’ view that the audit was
‘ineffective’. Such criticism, if warranted, would
most probably be the result of the selection
processes and/or poor audit performance. The
remedy for these deficiencies is largely in the
hands of the audit office. Fortunately, such
deficiencies can be shown to be the exception
rather than the rule.
Audit selection and an audit programme
are significantly determined by the availability
of resources both in quantity and professional
expertise. Given the limited audit resource
base and the extent of the mandate coverage,
selection has to be risk-based and involve
judgement. In Australia, the Joint Committee
of Public Accounts and Audit (JCPAA) plays an
important role in both processes, as well as in
the determination of the Audit Budget. The
JCPAA has the responsibility for reviewing the
annual resource requirements and operations
of the ANAO and determining the audit
priorities of the parliament. Without
explanation, such provisions may appear to be
contrary to requirements for audit
independence. However, in practice, the
reverse is the case, for example with the JCPAA
being able to review the ANAO’s budget
estimates in relation to its workload, particularly
reflected in its audit programme, and the
JCPAA’s determination of parliament’s audit
priorities.
In the Australian situation, questions have
been raised as to whether the frequency of
government requests for audits and the
consequent pressure on the auditor-general
affects the latter’s independence. In particular,
the process (assurance) oriented nature of such
requests was seen as a possible deliberate
strategy to lower the ANAO’s capacity to
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undertake value-for-money programme
performance audits. At the very least, the
number and complexity (particularly in terms
of resource demands) of government-requested
audits would have a marked impact on the
completion of any audit programme. Any public
misconception about the processes bearing on
the selection of performance audits and any
subsequent ‘gap’ in expectation of the outcomes
to be achieved could be largely ameliorated by
the government referring any audit requests to
the JCPAA for review. This would reinforce the
non-political role of the JCPAA, as well as its
authority and effectiveness. Nevertheless, the
ultimate decision has to be made by the auditor-
general.
A major issue for performance auditing is
the maintenance of parliamentary and public
confidence in the coverage, timeliness and
outcomes of such audits, as well as effective
action to ensure proper implementation of any
recommendations and conclusions. In my view,
the confidence, co-operation, involvement, and
commitment of the organizations and people
being audited is also a factor that needs to be
kept in mind. In a number of respects, this is
where there are apparent and real expectation
gaps leading to limited or no improvements
with flow-on consequences for other
stakeholders and their level of confidence in
performance auditing. Audit offices generally
recognize this ‘reality’ and endeavour to involve
those stakeholders in the strategic planning
and audit programming processes. This is well
illustrated in the comprehensive work
programme undertaken each year by the ANAO
(ANAO, 2010a).
One advantage is to minimize unnecessary
duplication of activity on other reviews and
evaluations and the often considerable costs
involved. Where it is decided to go ahead with
a performance audit and another review, the
timing of each activity can not only achieve
highly efficient and effective complementation
of coverage, analysis and reporting but also a
comprehensive and integrated approach to
improving the relevant programme outcomes.
In other words, one activity can ‘reinforce’ and
give greater credibility to the other.
Some question too close an involvement
with auditees as a potential erosion of audit
independence. Ironically, they do not see the
same problem with any consultation or insights
provided by ‘clients’ of auditees, the general
public or even media. A distinction should be
made between obtaining information
(expertise) and the exercise of judgement and
decision-making. A quite common criticism of
auditors, particularly in the conduct of
performance audits, is that they do not really
understand the changing environment in which
the auditee has to operate, the various pressures
being applied, the management and technical
complexities involved and the factors impacting
on the auditee’s achievement of required results.
Close involvement and co-operation with
auditees, particularly in the strategic planning
and programming stages of performance
auditing, can provide significant ‘dividends’
for all parties in their own understanding of
issues that impact on performance ranging
from the governance framework through to
actual service delivery and the associated
accountability requirements. For auditors, this
approach has been an important part of
building credible and useful knowledge
management systems, which enhance audit
capability, lessen auditee frustration in having
to continually ‘educate’ auditors about their
agency’s operations, and improve audit
efficiency, including lower audit costs for both
the audit office and the auditees.
Performance assessment
The focus of this article is largely on two aspects
of audit performance and its assessment—the
conduct of performance audits and related
reports and the implementation of findings
and recommendations. Both aspects are
impacted by audit selection and programming
and any consequential ‘expectation gaps’ that
need to be addressed, such as just what is the
‘value’ being assessed as part of the focus of
much of performance auditing on ‘value for
money’ achieved. I discussed this issue in an
article included in this journal in 2010 (Barrett,
2010b). The research involved pointed to both
‘real’ and ‘perceived’ expectation gaps, which
can apply more broadly to the outcomes of
performance audits.
From an examination of performance
assessment and reporting across a number of
audit offices (Australia, New Zealand, Canada,
USA, and the UK), there is a sound basis for
public (and political) confidence in the
accountability measures in place. In particular,
there is a high level of transparency and
explanation of performance assessments,
including extensive involvement of major
stakeholders by those offices (see ANAO, 2010b,
pp. 24–48; NZ Controller and Auditor-General,
2010, pp. 14–18; GAO, 2010). Reports are
subject to quality assurance reviews, including
adherence to relevant auditing standards and
to professional practice requirements. A major
thrust of audit office performance has been to
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‘add value’ to public administration. Perceptions
about just what this means are therefore central
to any assessment about that performance.
Looking across the audit offices mentioned
above, the UK National Audit Office (NAO)
places significant emphasis on measurement of
financial impact on benefits achieved. On the
front page of the NAO’s annual report for
2011, the following statement highlighted its
performance as follows: ‘Our work in the year
led to audited financial impacts of more than
£1 billion, improved services to citizens, and
increased transparency and accountability’
(NAO, 2011). The UK Comptroller and Auditor
General, in a response to my earlier PMM
article, observed that: ‘performance audit
carries far more weight where we can quantify
the gap between current performance and the
outcomes envisaged by policy-makers’ (Morse,
2010).
Similarly, the US Government
Accountability Office (GAO) puts considerable
weight on its achievement of financial benefits
in its annual documentation (GAO, 2011a,
2011b, p. 6). For 2010, financial benefits were
assessed at $US 49.9 billion. These are
significant amounts and lead to the question as
to just what benefits can be actually achieved
and by when. There have also been questions
about the audit associations of ‘cause’ and ‘effect’
in determining the attribution of such benefits.
One test might be any action by treasury
departments to ‘harvest’ such savings.
Auditees often claim such benefits come
from their own learning and insights, as well as
from those the auditors may have gleaned
from their wide experience. However, the
general public would probably only be
interested in the actual achievement of the
financial benefit. Consequently, there are
perception issues that need to be addressed.
More importantly, there may well be duplication
in attributed performance improvements
between the relevant stakeholders. There is no
guarantee that, even in the USA where the
GAO has a quite disciplined approach to
verifying and validating performance data
(GAO, 2011c), there is no such duplication.
In other countries, such as Australia, much
lower estimates of financial impacts/benefits
are generally identified. The estimated ‘savings’
in individual reports generally depend on the
relevant agencies/departments taking identified
action such as ‘being more proactive’,
‘rationalizing reporting mechanisms’, and
‘better matching of program payments to local
government’ (ANAO, 2006). Such comments
reflect the often management/administrative
efficiency and cost-effectiveness orientation of
performance auditing. This should not be
surprising in countries such as Australia, New
Zealand and the United Kingdom, where the
auditors-general are precluded from
commenting on government policy.
Nevertheless, as Morse (2010, p. 324) observed:
‘If our purpose is to effect change, we need to
go beyond providing assurance and making
judgements by advising audited bodies on how
they might improve their performance’;
recommendations ‘must flow from solid
evidence of what works’ without being overly
prescriptive. This, unfortunately, is fertile
ground for misconceptions to arise as to who is
responsible for performance improvements or
lack of them.
Real or apparent expectation gaps, in
relation to such outcomes, and cause/effect
debates, frequently result from a lack of
understanding and/or unrealistic expectations
of performance auditing and of the public
sector. While my research indicates that audit
offices have increasingly provided better public
explanations and documentation of the various
audit processes and results, the same cannot be
said about public sector programmes and results
achieved. Performance measures continue to
be largely related to processes and outputs, not
programme outcomes. In part, this is because
other levels of government and the private,
including not-for-profit, sectors actually deliver
those outcomes. An added complication has
been the development of more ‘joint
arrangements’ with a lack of clarity about the
responsibilities/accountabilities involved. The
use of ‘lead agency’ arrangements and
‘partnership agreements’ have not made a
demonstrable difference in these respects.
Many factors impact on the development
of credible, reliable and meaningful
performance measures and their assessment,
particularly in quantitative terms. Qualitative
measures are often easier to articulate and can
provide greater confidence if properly
constructed. Many government programmes
have long-term objectives with the results not
being apparent for 10, 20 or more years. Audit
offices have recognized these difficulties and
have produced better or best practice guides
(ANAO, 2004; NAO, 2009) and encouraged
the use of ‘intermediate outcomes’ to simplify
and facilitate useful performance information.
It is important to recognize that it is the agency/
department’s corporate governance,
management, operations and results that are
being audited. The audit can determine
whether there is appropriate and useful
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performance information or not. If there is,
the performance audit can opine on the
measure’s suitability for the purpose and the
extent to which the performance required is
achieved. It is not the auditor’s responsibility to
determine more suitable measures and audit
performance against them. Unfortunately, this
is often an expectation of the media and of
some politicians.
This raises one issue for consideration in
meeting an apparent expectation gap in relation
to programme performance and audit. Many
of us have had experience with government
programmes which have outlived their
usefulness. As well, we know of programmes
which are either not capable of meeting the
specified objectives (or intentions) or are only
partially doing so. Policy failures may be due to
inefficient and/or ineffective governance and
administrative arrangements for
implementation such as in the case of the
recent home insulation program (ANAO,
2010c) in Australia. However, such failures
may also be due to other factors such as ‘changed
circumstances’, ‘deficient policy advice’ or ‘lack
of engagement/response by the target group’.
The expectation would be that the relevant
agencies/departments would bring any such
‘failures’ to the attention of relevant ministers
with suitable advice as to alternative courses of
action. However, experience shows that there
is often reluctance to indicate that ‘the emperor
has no clothes’. While it is clearly inappropriate
for an auditor-general to comment on
government policy (prohibited in many
jurisdictions), it would seem helpful to the
parliament, and to the government, to be made
aware as to whether action being taken is likely
to achieve the policy objectives specified,
efficiently and effectively. This is quite different
to questioning the objectives themselves,
including as to whether any ‘failure’ is due to
policy weaknesses.
Implementation of audit recommendations
Perceptions about performance are often
largely influenced by the results achieved. How
the results are being achieved is also important.
While audit selection and programming
outcomes are reflected in audit findings,
conclusions and recommendations, and should
influence perceptions, separate judgements will
still be made about the effectiveness of those
outcomes. Performance measures are essential
for judgements about the professionalism, cost,
quality, and conduct of audits. Such measures
are regularly reported by audit offices and
subject to independent, as well as peer, review
examination and public reporting. A number
of reviews are conducted each year by the
internal auditors, independent private sector
experts, and perhaps more importantly, by
public accounts committees in the various
jurisdictions. In Australia, all ANAO reports
are reviewed by the JCPAA with about one-
third being subject to public inquiry and
examination, including the relevant
participants. Over the years, the ANAO has
also arranged peer reviews of a number of its
performance audits by the New South Wales
State Auditor-General and by the New Zealand
Auditor-General. As well, it has been involved
in a number of peer reviews of other offices
(ANAO, 2010b, p. 5), which has been a
significant ‘learning’ experience providing
valuable insights for performance
improvement.
That said, ‘real or perceived’ expectation
gaps can occur where there is limited evidence
of implementation of ‘agreed’ performance
audit recommendations. Many audit offices
include comments from auditees; particularly
the acceptance or otherwise of audit
recommendations in the relevant reports.
Indeed, while such inclusions have been made
in ANAO performance audit reports for over
eight years, it is now a requirement under
legislation. It should be a reasonable expectation
that ‘agreed’ audit recommendations would be
implemented in a timely fashion.
Unfortunately, despite the range of follow-up
action taken by the parliament, and audit offices
in particular, government departments and
agencies are frequently quite tardy in their
implementation, sometimes only addressing
them partially and occasionally not at all. This
situation is somewhat surprising given the
emphasis on sound corporate governance,
including the establishment of audit
committees, for more than a decade in Australia.
It has been identified, and reinforced, good
practice for audit committees to have
‘implementation of audit findings and
recommendations’ as a regular item on their
agendas and to provide regular reports to the
governance body, including the agency head.
I will comment, if only briefly, on the main
‘incentives’ for action on performance audit
findings and recommendations because they
have not been fully effective. The question has
to be asked as to what more could, or should, be
done, to assure the parliament and the public
that appropriate action has been taken to
implement performance audit
recommendations. First, there is the positive
incentive to improve performance both for the
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public good and for the reputation and job
satisfaction of those involved in an era where
there have been increasing demands for better
governance and more accountable government.
Audit offices have a policy of follow-up action
on audit recommendations, including through
any ‘observer’ status on their auditees’ audit
committees. As part of the audit programme,
follow-up audits are determined on the basis of
auditor observations/recommendations. Given
the wide-ranging demands for audits, both
assurance and performance, there is only
limited scope for follow-up audits each year.
Some years ago, in Australia, the then
department of finance conducted a systematic
review of the implementation of audit
recommendations each year. Agency assertions
were subject to a requirement for supporting
‘evidence’. A report was provided to the minister
for finance and tabled in both houses of
parliament. It may well be time to consider
such a policy again.
By far the most effective follow-up action in
Australia, in my view, is taken by the JCPAA.
Unfortunately, the JCPAA also has to limit such
activity to its capacity to meet the demands of its
programme of inquiries and reports each year.
One quite effective approach adopted by the
JCPAA has been to ask the relevant agencies/
departments for their assessment of the most
realistic timetable for implementation of
performance audit recommendations and
indicate that the JCPAA secretary will contact
them to check on progress at that time. If the
JCPAA is not satisfied with the response, they
will decide whether to re-open their inquiry
and possibly widen its scope to review related
activities and any implications of failure to
implement the audit recommendations.
All parties recognize that a number of,
often unforeseen, factors can impact adversely
on implementation of audit recommendations.
They can be internally or externally driven.
For example, there may simply be a lack of
capacity by the organization concerned because
of unavailability of the appropriate resources,
a lack of financial or other capacities to make
the changes, variations in programme objectives
and/or strategies and priorities, a changing
environment with different demands and/or
contributions from other stakeholders,
including programme beneficiaries, or simply
other government demands with higher
priority. It would be naïve to think that these
might not be given as ‘convenient’ excuses in
some circumstances. However, agencies should
be asked to demonstrate such situations and
their likely impact on the implementation of
audit recommendations. The intention has to
be to ensure accountability for the effective
implementation of agreed audit
recommendations.
Looking at the approaches of other audit
offices, the New Zealand Office of the Auditor-
General follows up on recommendations made
in performance audit reports ‘to understand
and confirm that public entities had taken
action in response to those recommendations’
(NZ Controller and Auditor-General, 2010, p.
17) This is not too dissimilar to the ANAO
approach. The NAO has a quite robust
approach where, for example: ‘We record an
impact only when the related benefit has been
brought about, we have data to substantiate the
benefit, and the audited body gives its
agreement’ (NAO, 2011, p. 79).
The NAO observes that the impact of its
recommendations are not always separable from
other influences and, in these cases, the NAO
agrees a proportion of an overall financial impact
with the audited body based on an assessment of
the likely level of influence of the NAO’s work.
The GAO uses a set of quite stringent tests in its
follow-up of ‘past recommendations
implemented’ (GAO, 2011a, appendix 1, p. 1
and pp. 4–5). Both the NAO and GAO only
specify ‘net benefits’ achieved from
implementation of audit recommendations. That
is, they deduct costs associated with taking the
action recommended. Two other observations
of GAO experience and practice are of particular
interest in relation to accountability for
implementation of audit recommendations. First,
experience has shown that ‘if a recommendation
has not been implemented within four years, it is
not likely to be implemented’. Second, GAO staff
must verify, with sufficient supporting
documentation, that an agency’s reported actions
in relation to audit recommendations are
adequately being implemented (GAO, 2011a, p.
4). As well, the Congress is provided with a
database which sets out the status of
recommendations that have not been
implemented.
An implementation conundrum
Possibly the most disappointing and frustrating
aspect of performance auditing is the recurring
nature of audit issues despite recommendations
in previous reports, better practice guides and
development of related guidance or guidelines.
Various explanations have been put forward,
such as the changing nature of the economic
and social environment, changing political
imperatives and timeframes for results,
pressures on resources—including cutbacks,
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turnover of staff and loss of expertise, devolution
of authority, and increased focus on shared
responsibility involving other levels of
government, the not-for-profit sector and
private sector firms. However, this leaves a not
insignificant expectations gap in relation to the
effectiveness of performance auditing,
particularly in the media and the parliament
and, as a result, in the general public.
A full exploration of this issue could well be
the subject of a separate research article. My
purpose here is to draw attention to what I
think is a credibility gap in accountability rather
than a real or perceived expectations gap in
performance auditing. I want to illustrate this
in three areas—procurement, contract
management, and defence projects, using
largely Australian examples but noting that
similar experience can be illustrated in other
countries. These three areas—obviously
interrelated—involved billions of dollars of
budget revenue each year. They also have a
marked impact on the efficiency and
effectiveness of both government and business.
Therefore, it would seem imperative to ensure
accountability for both the processes and
outcomes involved. As a broad indicator of the
number of performance audits conducted on
these topics in the past decade or so, the search
index on the ANAO homepage
(www.anao.gov.au) showed 24 reports under
‘procurement’, 38 reports under ‘contract
management’, and 15 under ‘defence
projects’—a significant amount of activity.
Procurement: Looking at procurement first, the
Australian Auditor-General, in his performance
audit report on the Implementation of the Revised
Commonwealth Procurement Guidelines (CPGs)
noted that: ‘these changes did not alter the
overarching principle of value-for-money,
through encouraging competition,
accountability and transparency, and the
efficient, effective and ethical use of resources’
(ANAO, 2007).
In other words, the fundamental
performance requirements of the long-standing
CPGs continued to apply. This was re-
emphasised in a recent report on Direct Source
Procurement (ANAO, 2010d, para. 3, p. 16). The
outcome of this latter audit is, perhaps, best
summed up by a comment from the department
of finance and deregulation: ‘This audit report
highlights practices that are of concern because
they indicate a lack of understanding of key
rules and procedures in Commonwealth
procurement, underpinned by legislation, and
an appreciation that these are intended to
promote value for money and accountability’
(ANAO, 2010d, para. 67, p. 36).
There was extensive media coverage and
criticism of the lack of accountability on what
have been considered to be established best
practices for procurement. Given the long-
standing successive government and
parliamentary concerns about procurement
outcomes, I find it difficult to accept that the
term “guidelines” in the title of the CPGs can be
misconstrued by entities as representing non-
mandatory requirements’ (Finance and
Deregulation, 2011). I note that regulation 7 of
the Financial Management and Accountability
Regulations requires that officials must act in
accordance with the CPGs when undertaking
procurements. Reword: slightly unclear?
Contract management: Contract management is
integral to both procurement and defence
project accountability and performance
concerns. The ANAO recently made reference
to the long-standing advice provided to agencies
by the department of finance and deregulation
that ‘evergreen provisions’ (that is, no limit on
the number of performance-based contract
extensions) do not provide the necessary
assurance that ‘the value for money
requirements of the policy framework in the
CPGs will be met and that they are likely to limit
competition’ (ANAO, 2011b). Nevertheless, no
such restriction applied to the particular
contract being audited which had a history of
serious cost overruns. Belatedly, corrective
action was being put in place. In another report,
the ANAO’s recommendations related to quite
fundamental contract management
performance covered in better practice guides
(ANAO, 2009).
Defence projects: There has been a high level of
frustration with defence projects in all of the
countries referred to in this article, fuelled by
successive performance audit reports frequently
revealing the same ongoing management and
administrative problems and deficiencies
(Smelt, 2008). Undoubtedly, many projects are
in the high technology area, which involve a
degree of uncertainty and significant
management challenges, including staff
rotation and turnover, with considerable private
sector and other national government
participation. This is not just an exercise in
allocating blame for inadequate performance
and lack of effective action to remedy observed
deficiencies. The emphasis should be on how
to enhance performance and provide greater
confidence to the Australian government,
PUBLIC MONEY & MANAGEMENT MARCH 2012
8
© 2012 THE AUTHORS
JOURNAL COMPILATION © 2012 CIPFA
parliament and general public. Of interest in
this regard is the development of an annual
programme (and associated funding) to enable
the ANAO to review major defence projects
being managed by the Defence Materiel
Organization (DMO). This effectively makes
the ANAO part of the ongoing accountability
and assurance framework for defence.
The first ANAO report in relation to this
initiative was tabled in parliament in November
2008 (covering nine projects). The approach
adopted builds on international experience,
particularly in the UK and USA. It is hoped
that not only will there be an earlier information
flow to all stakeholders and greater
accountability, but that it ‘will also assist DMO
in pursuing its agenda to improve its
performance in managing major acquisition
projects’ (ANAO, 2008c). The report also
indicates an increased focus on accountability
and management, in particular risk
management. Audit reports in each of the next
two years covered 15 and 22 major projects
respectively, with the aim of bringing the total
number of projects to 28 in the 2011 report. All
are subject to JCPAA review. Not surprisingly,
that committee has taken a close interest in the
reports and ‘provided constructive input to
both the ANAO and the DMO on ways in which
the Major Projects Report (MPR) could be
improved’ (ANAO, 2010e, para. 7, p. 15).
The ANAO has stressed that the level of
assurance provided by these reviews is ‘less
than that typically provided by our performance
audits’ (ANAO 2010e, para. 10, p. 16).
Nevertheless, valuable information is being
provided, particularly for longitudinal analysis
of projects over time. The focus applied to
schedule performance by DMO as an effective
means of them managing schedule (slippage)
and budget performance (costs) is essential for
their overall performance. Interestingly, while
the projects’ budgeted cost requires ‘careful
management’ by the DMO, this dimension of
project performance has not been a major issue
(ANAO, 2010e, para. 17, p. 18). However, the
ANAO has also observed that the total time for
the 22 major projects to achieve their final
operational capability date is expected to be
almost one-third longer than was originally
planned. There is clearly some way to go to
engender ‘real’ and ‘sustained’ confidence, at
least at the political level, if a recent comment
by the minister for defence is any indication,
when he placed a whole list of defence culture
and management woes under the label of
‘improving personal and institutional
accountability’ (Australian Financial Review,
2011). The focus is well and truly on
accountability for performance.
Concluding thoughts
This article is about ‘expectation gaps’ in relation
to performance auditing, largely from an
Australian perspective. Gaps in understanding
arise from lack of knowledge and/or
understanding and from ‘embedded prejudice’
or, simply, strongly held beliefs or personal
philosophy. We can, and should, do something
about the former but little, if anything, more
can be done about the latter. Some expectations
are quite unrealistic, being overly optimistic or
simply too pessimistic. Nevertheless, we have
to be both pro-active and transparent—and
honest—in what we do and say we do. In my
experience, these have been the approaches
taken by public sector auditors even if there are
occasional shortcomings. An important asset in
this respect is their legislative independence.
Restrictions can be imposed on the audit
mandate and on the resources available for
audit, as well as non-acceptance of audit findings
and recommendations, all of which impact
adversely on stakeholder expectations and
create ‘gaps’. Fortunately, at least in most
western democracies, the reverse is mainly the
case. There has been strong ongoing support
for public auditing and, indeed, for
performance auditing.
Three areas have been identified where
‘expectation gaps’ can occur—the application
of professional standards, accountability for
audit performance and the implementation of
audit recommendations. There is demonstrable
positive supporting evidence of addressing the
first two areas, reinforced by wide-ranging
consultation and public explanation.
Nevertheless, ongoing gaps—real or
apparent—in stakeholder expectations in these
respects need to be addressed continually in an
economic, efficient and effective manner by
audit offices. Hopefully this might be
accomplished by illustrating, and reinforcing,
the kind of approaches and actions discussed in
this article. The question which clearly requires
attention is whether ‘expectation gaps’ have
been adequately, and effectively, addressed is
in the implementation of audit
recommendations.
Particularly where audit recommendations
are accepted by the relevant organization, it is
disappointing to discover in later audits that no
suitable implementation action has been taken.
The expectation is that implementation has
taken place unless, for instance, circumstances
have changed to make the recommendations
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redundant. In most countries, appropriate
follow-up action is taken. To a point, this should
impose a ‘discipline’ on the implementation
process. While I fully support the view that an
audit which finds evidence of high levels of
performance—whether in administrative
processes, programme outputs or outcomes—
with only limited recommendations, adds value
and should give added confidence to all
stakeholders in the accountability framework
for public sector performance. That said, there
should not be an expectation that audits would
only be conducted in areas where there are
apparent problems and/or lack of performance.
The article has referred to the highly
disciplined approach taken by the GAO in
following up and assuring implementation of
audit recommendations. The NAO also has a
similar approach to ensuring that the ‘savings’
attributable to implementation of audit
recommendations are actually achieved. There
would be doubts that smaller audit offices would
have the resource capacity to undertake similar
action. It might be argued that creating scope
to do so by undertaking fewer audits would
result in more effective audit outcomes.
Unfortunately, this could also result in a
difficulty for those offices in recruiting and
retaining professional auditors.
A credible outcome—which would
minimize any expectation gap—would
preferably involve some kind of independent
assessment and information based on
appropriate expertise. This puts the problem
back in the auditors’ bailiwick. Another
possibility would be to have a ‘sign-off’ on
implementation of audit recommendations by
the organization’s internal auditor or,
preferably, by an audit committee. These
alternatives may not be seen as sufficiently
‘independent’ to eliminate any expectation gap
but, pragmatically, might be given the
opportunity to do so. In Australia, consideration
should at least be given to restoring the Finance
Department responsibility for regular reporting
to the minister and to the parliament on the
implementation of audit recommendations.
More ambitiously, perhaps, consideration
should be given to provide the JCPAA with
more resources to follow-up such reporting.
Hopefully, performance information provided
by departments and agencies in the future will
reflect improved programme outcomes as a
result, and ameliorate any real or perceived
expectation gap about the value added by
performance auditing.
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